Last night’s all-out Russian attack on Ukraine — a full-scale invasion — sent shockwaves around the world on Thursday. The concert of indignation is unanimous between Ottawa and the Western capitals, which are preparing the response. But on the ground, it is indeed a war that has been started.

Here we decipher the ins and outs of the situation, with Dominique Arel, holder of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Ottawa, and Guillaume Sauvé, researcher at Cerium at the University of Montreal and specialist in Russia and of the post-Soviet space.

Even though tension on the Russian-Ukrainian border had been mounting for weeks and a conflict was imminent, does Russia’s attack on Ukraine tonight surprise you with its speed and scale? ?

Guillaume Sauve: To be honest, I’m in shock, like my fellow Russia specialists. Many of us believed that there would be no total invasion of Ukraine. We thought of a large part of bluff, we took with a grain of salt the warnings of the United States. It’s pretty much the worst-case scenario unfolding.

Dominique Arel: Even if the Americans rightly kept announcing it as “imminent”, the big surprise remains that this massive attack took place. What seemed unimaginable just two months ago is unfolding before our eyes. The impact is devastating.

What should we decode Moscow’s intentions from now on?

Dominique Arel: The intentions are clear. They want to destroy the Ukrainian army – what Putin calls “demilitarization” – overthrow the Ukrainian government (by arresting all its leaders) to replace it with a Vichy-type collaboration regime [du nom du régime français qui a gouverné la France pendant l’occupation allemande durant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale]. And then continue the partition of Ukraine, extending the control of the self-declared republics [la République populaire de Donetsk et la République populaire de Lougansk, dans l’est de l’Ukraine] all over Donbas [les républiques prorusses occupent environ le tiers de la région du Donbas].

Guillaume Sauve: As a precaution, we must rely on declared intentions. I don’t believe, for example, that Russia wants to rebuild the USSR: it doesn’t have the means. But the general objective is to prevent Ukraine from becoming a base, a regime at the service of the United States — and therefore a NATO base on Russia’s borders. This is the long declared objective, the red line drawn by Putin — Ukraine cannot be part of NATO.

How does Vladimir Putin’s speech on Monday — in which he acknowledged the independence of pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine — help to understand what is happening today?

Dominique Arel : Recognition came at the very end of the speech. The essence was an attack on the very idea that Ukrainians could constitute a separate nation with their own state. He hammered home that Ukrainian nationalism is “radical” and “Nazi”. He insisted that Ukrainians, due to corruption, are unable to govern themselves, a pure colonial vision. With 200,000 troops on the border, his words were a declaration of war on Ukraine.

Guillaume Sauve: Since 2014, it was thought that one of the ways [pour régler le conflit] was the Minsk process: the agreements around a possible return of the two secessionist provinces within Ukraine. For Russia, this would have allowed a kind of decentralization of Ukraine, and would have given Moscow political leverage inside Ukraine.

Since Monday, this strategy has been abandoned. By recognizing the independence of the provinces, we are throwing the Minsk agreements in the trash. Russia no longer counts on a return of these provinces to play inside Ukrainian politics. Since they still have the ambition to influence Ukrainian politics, the Russians find other ways to do so.

How ? It’s hard to predict at this stage, but the minimum option seems to be the demilitarization of Ukraine. It involves the simultaneous destruction of all of the country’s military infrastructure to force it to its knees and abandon plans to join NATO.

The real decisive moment is what happened that night. Until now, the specialists thought that we were going towards a Georgian scenario [en 2008, la Russie a reconnu deux régions séparatistes dans le nord de la Géorgie, petit État dans les montagnes du Caucase — l’armée est présente depuis pour en assurer la sécurité], where we would have seen the Russian army militarily occupy the two secessionist republics to “freeze” the conflict. But the invasion of all of Ukraine is something else. From there, it’s unclear how far Putin’s Russia can go.

What is the basis for the idea that Ukraine is not a separate nation?

Dominique Arel: Russian nationalism has always presented the Ukrainian national idea as artificial, as created by the West (historically by Austria and Poland; now by the United States). This is why Putin has been repeating for 15 years that the Ukrainian state is not real.

The USSR had recognized Ukrainian “nationality” because it had to come to terms with it in order to establish its legitimacy. Contrary to what Putin claims, the territorial division of this Ukraine corresponded largely to the national feeling of the residents who identified themselves as Ukrainians. Ukraine is therefore very real. The accusation of genocide [le président Poutine affirme que les russophones d’Ukraine sont victimes d’une purge] is obscene, Russian propaganda had already played this card when it annexed Crimea in 2014. There were over 2,000 civilian deaths in 2014-2015… which has nothing to do with genocide.

In your eyes, does the Russian invasion mark the most serious threat to international peace since the Second World War? Is it at this level?

Dominique Arel : Absolutely. The Charter of the United Nations is based on a cardinal principle: the territorial integrity of States. The invasion of Kuwait in 1990 led to the first Gulf War and the reversal of the invasion. This time, NATO will not intervene. But the precedent has just been set, and we immediately think of China and Taiwan… The radicalism of Russian policy no longer excludes other attacks.

Guillaume Sauve : In my opinion, I hope I am not mistaken, this is not a world war scenario. Russia does not have the means or the ambition for world conquest. It is trying to preserve its influence in its near abroad and in countries considered essential – Ukraine is at the top of the list. Nobody has an interest in seeing a war break out between nuclear powers, and I do not feel that NATO is ready to engage directly [pour défendre un pays qui n’est pas membre de cette alliance].

At this point, does the strategy of economic sanctions by the international community still have any use? Otherwise, what to expect from NATO, in particular?

Dominique Arel: Sanctions will not stop Putin, but they can significantly weaken the Russian economy in the medium and long term. It remains to be seen how far the Americans and Europeans (as well as Canadians) are prepared to go with the severity of the sanctions. If the fighting with the Ukrainian army continues, NATO could increase its military aid. A much larger presence of NATO forces [quelque 600 soldats canadiens sont en Lettonie, ancienne république soviétique voisine de la Russie] in the countries of central Europe, some on the Russian border, as well as the accession of Sweden and Finland cannot be ruled out.

What role can Canada play now?

Dominique Arel: Continue to coordinate its policies with the United States and the European Union. If the war leads to a very large number of refugees fleeing the Russian occupation, Canada should offer a larger reception, in terms of proportion, because of its historical ties with Ukraine [le Canada compte la troisième population ukrainienne en importance au monde, soit près de 1,3 million de personnes. De ce nombre, plus de 42 000 sont établies au Québec].

Guillaume Sauve: We must not overestimate our ability to have an impact on the ground. The best thing to do is to provide humanitarian support to Ukraine in this situation. As for economic sanctions, I don’t think that will have major consequences.